openopen
previous chapterprevious chapterprevious chapterprevious chapter
next chapternext chapternext chapternext chapter
closeclose
Part 1: Background

1-2: Picture concept and picture genesis

Pictures

The traditional discussion of earliest pictures in ontogeny (earliest in terms of temporal sequence within the development of "children’s drawings") is most often based on a largely unexamined differentiation of "picture" and "sculpture" and only considers two-dimensional products (flat products which are to be understood as two-dimensional). This differentiation, or rather separation, is by no means self-evident. With regard to a potential parallel in phylogeny it even challenges us to a fundamental reconsideration. This notwithstanding, we will uphold this qualification here and look at the concept of the picture solely in terms of two-dimensional products which we will call the graphic. More precisely, the term "graphic" shall refer to intentional, two-dimensional and visually perceptible products, whose purpose lies in their contemplation. 

Three picture concepts in the description of early pictorial development in ontogeny

Leaving aside the differentiation between the pictorial and the picture (individual aspects versus the product in its entirety) and disregarding two-dimensional manifestations that are directly perceived as sensory motor prints, the literature offers three principal assumptions on pictorial development in ontogeny. These correspond to the following three conceptual formulas:

1. Graphic expressions = pictures as drawings or paintings = depictions

2. Graphic expression

3. Graphic expressions = pictures = drawings and/or paintings = formal or abstract expressions 
    and/or depictions and/or other types of relationships between the graphic and the non-graphic

We are thus dealing with three different picture concepts with regard to picture genesis. The first one assumes that the graphic as an intentional two-dimensional product primarily and on principle relates to the depiction. The picture comes into being with the depiction. The second concept assumes that the drawing develops first and is then transformed into a depiction and thus into the pictorial. The drawing permits the depiction and subsequently merges with it. The third concept assumes that intentional two-dimensional manifestations can be depictions but may not be reduced to them. According to this last assumption, all depictions are pictures but not all pictures are depictions; it follows that their genesis has to be regarded in a differentiated and reciprocal way.

Three picture concepts in the description of early pictorial development in  ontogeny

According to the three different concepts of pictures mentioned, in the literature, we can identify three different ways to describe and interpret the early development of graphic expressions in ontogeny.

According to the first one (elaborated in exemplary fashion by Golomb, 2002, 2004; cf. in this context also the short summary by Wallon, 2007, p. 29-31), the earliest two-dimensional manifestations are seen as an expression of sensory motor functions with increasing subsequent differentiation, both in terms of the movement itself and in terms of its visual control. Where visual abilities assume control over graphic expression, i.e., dominate it, a shape is produced (as a rule a closed shape), which directly turns into a carrier of meaning and is then mostly used for the depiction of humans. Subsequent graphic differentiation is entirely at the service of depiction.

According to the second position (elaborated in exemplary fashion by Widlöcher, 1965, and Richter, 1987), the early sensory motor traces are followed by differentiations of distinct visually controlled formal or abstract manifestations – named the »birth of the drawing« by some authors – in which a graphic vocabulary of individual shapes, sometimes linked to simple topological arrangements, is prepared. These are increasingly used for creating analogies until finally the entire graphic configuration is subjected to the depiction principle as »birth of the picture«.

According to the third and rarely proposed position (elaborated in exemplary fashion by Kellogg, 1970; cf. also Stern, 1978), formal or abstract expressions follow the sensory motor manifestations in creating a primary and partially independent domain within graphic development; this is the first domain of graphic differentiation, and it continuously develops even after the emergence of depictions.

The three different picture concepts mentioned at the outset are thus mirrored by three different structural summaries of the early graphic and pictorial stages.

How come?

But how come that no empirical foundation and corresponding unified structural summary of early graphic stages managed to establish itself as a reference and that, instead, such different descriptions of the early stages of pictures exist side by side?

In our view this has to be seen against the background of a fundamental methodological difficulty in analysing picture genesis, along with an insufficient regard for early and earliest graphic manifestations. This explains why i) the discussion of picture genesis in ontogeny does not abide by an actual methodological standard, which is both traceable and replicable, and why ii) existing phenomenological foundations have remained disparate and fragmentary with existing literature referring to them in an inconsistent manner and interpreting them in different ways, and why iii) early manifestations are often described as "scribblings" and are therefore scarcely considered or even misunderstood.

The methodological problem is due, first of all, to the subject in question: a mass-like or even "infinite" phenomenon, whose representation–namely, the number and selection of children and their pictures to be compared in establishing a representative corpus–cannot rely on any given or simple measure.

The same applies to the question of picture qualities: which pictures should be examined, which pictures can be objectively or justifiably delimited, described, and concretely attributed to graphic products?

A final difficulty lies in publishing research findings in a scientifically adequate and justifiable manner.

The heterogeneity of existing foundations manifests itself in the various types of opposing studies:

The concepts applied, the picture qualities examined and the rules for assigning them do not undergo any kind of decisive reciprocal and continuous critical examination or subsequent coordination. Many studies do not in themselves distinguish, on the one hand, between a purely descriptive survey of attributes, structure building, and development tendencies, and on the other hand, the explanation thereof.

In addition to differences in type, method, and embedding in a paradigm, the way studies–with the exception of experimental studies in the narrowest sense–arrive at their results is rarely sufficiently verifiable; this is because the results depend on the investigators’ interpretation, which cannot be sufficiently quantified verbally, but also because only very few and specifically selected pictures are used in publications to illustrate the results.

The word "scribblings", to return to the third problem mentioned, may carry meaning in everyday language but it is often misleading due to its negative connotation and association with "mere motor skills", "unconscious production", and "randomness". In any case, it is not suitable as a scientific term for early pictorial activity. There is no binding definition for it and even if it were to be defined as a technical expression, it would not lend itself as a useful designation for the actual activity as a whole: its association with graphic intention, formal differentiation or any kind of meaning is too fuzzy; conversely, it is too closely linked to subtle or openly derogatory reflexes. Hence, the expression must be replaced.

To avoid misunderstandings: existing literature offers a wealth of picture descriptions and picture examples, each connected with corresponding classification suggestions and extrapolated development processes; and it is true that this allows us to gauge the extent of observable manifestations. As mentioned above, we also possess a limited number of individual examinations and documentations of early graphic expressions, both excellent and extensive, which are neither restricted to comparative compilations and summaries of other examinations or specific aspects such as early human depictions or the so called "schematism" of depictions, nor to narrowly defined experimental angles. Rather, they look at early graphic phases in their entirety. (The works of Kellogg and Matthews, even if very different in their approach, are particularly worth mentioning here as well as, outside of the academic sphere, the works of Stern. Based on our own studies, we expect that many of their claims will be confirmed in future empirical and phenomenological studies.) What we are lacking, however, is the possibility to derive from all this a general, binding, and transparent system of picture qualities in combination with rules for their assignment. We are lacking a way to determine the temporal sequence of each emerging graphic attribute or attribute type in a binding and traceable manner so as to deduct mutual interrelations in terms of structure formation and development processes. We do not yet have an established organizing principle for the wealth of early graphic manifestations that is sufficiently objectified and traceable, accepted as a standard and as a basis for assigning individual examples to a structure that describes the appearance and the emerging development of early pictures according to their fundamental attributes.